This week, I want to talk about a new side project I’m launching: An in-depth investigation into Chechen involvement in the Bucha massacre in March 2022. I’m going to be working on (and therefore talking about) this for a while, so I want to give you a little insight into the reasons behind it, and where I’m starting from.
Full disclosure: I am NOT good at sharing work in progress. On the one hand, I’m too much of a perfectionist to let something out of the door unless I’ve dotted every i and crossed every t. On the other hand, there can often be negative consequences for sharing work in development (you know, minor things, like someone nicking your best ideas or suing you). Generally, however, I think it’s a good thing to do, so I’m gonna do my best with this one!
Here’s what you’ll find in this week’s newsletter:
- The background to the issue
- The starting point for the investigation
- The gaps in the evidence base
- The key questions I’m looking to address
The question of Chechen involvement at Bucha
The Bucha massacre, if you remember, was one of the most shocking events in the early stages of the war. As Russian troops withdrew from the town at the start of April, social and mainstream media filled with reports of bodies strewn across the streets and widespread looting.
Ukraine launched an investigation. It asked the International Criminal Court (ICC) to consider it as part of its broader investigation into Russian war crimes. Numerous international media outlets produced in-depth investigative reports on what happened, and who was involved.
These did a good job of identifying the Russian units involved, with attention focusing in particular on those that belonged to the 76th Guards Air Assault Division. But — as is the nature of such things — there were gaps and unanswered questions. Some of these concerned the extent of Chechen involvement.
The starting point for the investigation
Numerous eyewitnesses from the town claimed that Chechen units were located in or near Bucha at the time of the massacre. But many of the survivor testimonies cited by the media lacked precision: They couldn’t say for certain that they were Chechen units or – if they were certain – how they knew.
The most in-depth work on the topic that I’ve seen came from this Reuters report. It’s this that serves as the starting point for my investigation. The article’s author, Mari Saito, managed to use a combination of geolocated social media posts and eyewitness interviews to ascertain that:
- Chechen troops at some point stayed outside Lubyanka, 13km to the north.
- Chechen commander Khuseyn Mezhidov was in Hostomel, 5km to the north, at the end of February.
- Another commander, Anzor Bisayev, was in Borodianka, 25km to the northwest, at the beginning of March.
- A third commander, Rayan Dokashev, was also in Borodianka toward the end of March.
There were also various reports of graffiti, Chechen flags, and matching uniforms.
Gaps in the evidence base
Circumstantially, the evidence of Chechen involvement is therefore quite strong. The Reuters article is a fine piece of reporting.
It’s when the evidence is looked at from a legal standpoint that the issues begin. Unlike the units of the 76th Guards, Saito was unable to say for certain that Mezhidov, Bisayev, and Dokashev were in Bucha — or, if other Chechen commanders were present instead, who they were. And I haven’t seen any other reporting that has offered anything more definitive on the question (if you have, please hit reply!).
It may be that investigators do have evidence that fills the gap. But, if they don’t, it would be impossible to hold the perpetrators to account — even if a concrete opportunity to do so were to arise. Based on the open-source evidence, there is not enough to link the perpetrators to the crime, much less go further up the leadership chain to identify command responsibility.
The key questions
These gaps are what this project hopes to fill. Specifically, I want to answer these questions:
- Were Chechen units involved in the Bucha massacre?
- If so, which units and individuals were involved?
- What can we say about the command structures at this stage of the war?
- How strong is the evidence base for their involvement?
It’s entirely possible that there is no new evidence to add. But I think it’s worth a try. And, even if it doesn’t unearth anything directly, it might still reveal something more about the nature of Chechen involvement at this stage of the conflict, when leadership and structures were much more fluid than they later became.
So, if you’re interested in this, stay tuned, because I’ll be talking plenty about it over the next few months! And if there are questions you would like the project to address, let me know!
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