🪖 Investigation sheds light on Russian propaganda in Central African Republic 🪖
An international consortium of investigative journalists — led by Forbidden Stories and involving Vazhnyye istorii and the Dossier Centre among others — has published information on Russian propaganda operations in the Central African Republic, linked to the Wagner Group and the networks built by its late-owner Yevgeniy Prigozhin.
The members of the investigative consortium have each published separately on the story, meaning some insights and important details are scattered across different outlets and articles. So here, I’ll try and bring together what are the most interesting and important points. It’s not clear whether there is more to come: Forbidden Stories seem to suggest there should be a video report as well, but their link to the trailer lead nowhere. I suspect this will just be a retelling of the textual story though.
The investigation centres around a 29-year-old “journalist” called Fidèle Ephrem Yalike-Ngonzo, who reportedly worked for organisations linked to Wagner and its late owner, Yevgeniy Prigozhin, before fleeing and handing over information to Western media outlets. Between 2019 and 2022, Yalike “contributed to the propagation of false news, promoted anti-Western demonstrations, and fueled arguments in favor of the Central African regime and its supporters in Moscow.” However, he slowly became disillusioned with the work, culminating in his departure from CAR in February 2024.
To reveal the story, Yalike first made contact with Western journalists in South Africa in autumn 2022, providing documentary evidence of his involvement with Wagner and instructions from his handlers. Yalike claims that he became disillusioned after being asked to participate in a cover-up of an attack on civilians in February 2022; he then became Wagner's prime suspect when the true story was leaked to the media the following month, leading to a confrontation with his handler. When he first tried to leave the country in February 2024, he was detained at Bangui airport and the authorities threatened to hand him over to Russian operatives. However, he was released from custody and finally managed to leave the country several days later, via a canoe crossing the Ubangi River. It was only once he was safely out of the country that he was prepared to speak publicly. Forbidden Stories portrays his decision to speak as motivated by a desire “to condemn the actions in which he participated and lay bare the propaganda techniques he used. But above all, it was to expose the clandestine forces of which he was first a witness, and then a victim.” One suspects saving his own skin was a more compelling motivation than moral condemnation — four years is quite a long time to work before remembering such niceties as professional and personal integrity, and he still wrote the cover-up — but who knows.
So what are the key findings from the investigation? The first relates to the evolution of the Russian propaganda network in CAR. The network began establishing itself shortly after Wagner arrived in the country, and Yalike claims this arrival was initially welcomed by locals, who felt abandoned following the decision by former colonial power France to withdraw its troops amid deteriorating relations with the Touadera regime. Yalike was at the outset clearly an enthusiastic collaborator with the network, appearing to put himself forward as a voice of the regime and admitting to being happy to receive the approximately €45 he was paid for each article. From this initial involvement, he progressed to working full-time for Wagner, providing summaries of what was being written about Russian activity in CAR and debunking negative stories via various local outlets — for which efforts he received up to €766 a month. These outlets were not unwitting participants, either, receiving their own payments for the publications. Russian actors, including Sputnik, then disseminated the stories further. Overall, it becomes clear how closely Russian operatives sometimes controlled the narrative, literally dictating stories for publication, although local regime-linked actors also played a key role. The network’s primary goals were discrediting Western countries and institutions, shaping public debate to favour the regime and Russian activities in the country, and finding suitably compliant “experts” to act as talking heads. This worked hand-in hand with other initiatives: Yalike claims, for example, that protests against the UN peacekeeping mission, MINUSCA, were paid for by Russia and then duly reported on by loyal outlets.
The second key finding is the identification of Mikhail Prudnikov as a key operative and Yalike’s handler in the CAR. Prudnikov, a 38-year-old from Tambov Oblast, previously participated in the Nashi youth movement, ran unsuccessfully for the Russian State Duma in 2010, and spoke publicly about information warfare before disappearing from public view in 2016. From there, he has gone on to participate in Prigozhin’s “Lakhta Project,” which coordinates disinformation campaigns around the world. According to Dossier Centre, Prudnikov first worked for Prigozhin in Sudan, after which he moved to CAR. He reportedly remains active in the country, though one suspects his involvement will go one of two ways: quietly moving on to somewhere else, now that he has lost his cover, or embracing a more public profile a la Dmitry Sytyy, who runs the Russian House cultural centre and frequently speaks to international media outlets.
The third key finding is that an organisation called Africa Politology is identified as a central node in the network that Yalike and Prudnikov belonged to. The organisation was led by high-ranking Prigozhin operative Sergey Mashkevich until at least 2022. It’s involvement isn’t perhaps that surprising — Africa Politology has already been sanctioned by Canada and the US for its role in Prigozhin’s propaganda operations — but the investigation offers further confirmation of the types of activities it engages in.
The reports, and a separate article by Forbidden Stories, also testify to the “omnipresent climate of fear” that impacts local media reporting not only in CAR, but also in the other countries where Wagner/African Corps operate: Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Anonymous journalists speak of how Russia has transformed the media landscape in the Sahel through its propaganda, bringing in or paying off journalists to shape narratives in the desired direction. The Russian-language publication African Initiative has, in the words of Filip Bryjka and Jedrzej Czerep from the Polish Institute of International Affairs, now become, “the main transmission belt of Russia’s (dis)information activities in Africa.” One of the cited examples explains how Russia has arranged trips for Malian journalists, who have then become involved in pro-Russian activism back home. Others across the region avoid certain topics for fear of retribution or becoming the target of smear campaigns. Any such fear is well-grounded. It was in CAR, after all, where one of the most notorious efforts to halt journalistic investigations into PMC activity occurred: In July 2018, Wagner operatives (or their local allies) killed the Russian journalists Orkhan Dzhemal, Aleksandr Rastorguyev, and Kirill Radchenko, shortly after they arrived in the country.
Sources: Forbidden Stories, Forbidden Stories, Forbidden Stories, Vazhnyye istorii, Dossier Centre​
Elsewhere in the world of Russian security
đź’Ł Terrorism & insurgency đź’Ł
Detention in Kaluga Oblast over terrorism plot: The Federal Security Service (FSB) reported on the detention of a 48-year-old man in Kaluga Oblast on charges of planning terrorist attacks during the March 2024 presidential elections. According to the FSB, the man was recruited by Ukrainian security services and intended to carry out the attacks in Belgorod, Bryansk, and Tula Oblasts, with diverse targets: police stations, energy facilities, and a security-service linked institution. An improvised explosive device and other weapons were found in his house, and six accomplices were also detained — but no details were provided on who or where.
Charges against Ingushetian resident upgraded: Islam Zagiyev, a resident of Ingushetia who was detained in June 2023, has now been accused of aiding terrorism. Homemade bombs were found in the house of Zagiyev and another resident of Inarki in Malgobekskiy Rayon, as part of an investigation into an attack on a police post the preceding April. Zagiyev — whose brother, Amirkhan Gurazhev, pledged allegiance to the Islamic State — was initially charged with failing to inform the authorities about insurgent activity. The case against Zagiyev has now been transferred to court.
Ingushetian imam accused of aiding terrorism: Abdulrashid Gardanov, imam of a Salafi mosque in Ingushetia’s Sunzha, has also been accused of aiding terrorism. Investigators claim that Gardanov provided the cell led by Gurazhev with weapons and money. An anonymous local analyst cited by Caucasian Knot accused the security services of inflating the threat of extremism in order to attract funding. Gardonov has fled Russia and been placed on the wanted list; he is believed to be in Turkey.
Kadyrov elaborates on Bryansk Oblast counterterrorism operation: Chechen Head Ramzan Kadyrov claims that four people who were killed in Bryansk Oblast in late October planned a series of sabotage attacks. Kadyrov claims the group consisted of foreign professional fighters.
German citizen accused of blowing up pipeline in Kaliningrad: The FSB has reported on the arrest of Nikolay Gayduk, a German citizen accused of blowing up a gas pipeline in Kaliningrad in March 2024. According to the Russian security services, 57-year-old Gayduk, a resident of Hamburg, was detained as he crossed the border from Poland into Kaliningrad Oblast. He has been arrested on terrorism charges. They published a video confession from Gayduk, who claimed he was operating on the orders of a retired police lieutenant colonel from Odessa who also lives in Hamburg.
Ingushetian World Cup plotters' appeal rejected: Russia’s Supreme Court has rejected an appeal against a terrorism conviction brought by Ingushetian residents Aslan Bekov and Ruslan Tsitskiyev. In 2022, the Southern District Military Court sentenced them to 21 and 20 years respectively for organising an Islamic State cell and planning terrorist attacks during the 2018 World Cup (alongside Bashir Aliyev and Muslim Galayev). Three people were killed during the special operation to arrest the group, which took place in Nazran in June 2018. Several witnesses had renounced their testimony during the trial and denied knowing the men, and Tsitskiyev claimed that he had been tortured by interrogators. Russia has a conviction percentage in the high 90s, and allegations of torture are rarely acknowledged by the courts.
Crocus City Hall attack charges amended: Investigators have amended the charges against four people accused of involvement in the March 2024 terrorist attack on Moscow’s Crocus City Hall. As a result, the brothers Aminchon Islomov and Dilovar Islomov, their father Isroil Islomov, and Alisher Kasimov now face charges of assisting terrorism, rather than direct participation in the attack. The Islomov family were connected to the incident through the white Renault that they had previously owned, which was used by the attackers. The changes to the charges have not, however, significantly improved their situation: whereas before they faced between 15 and 20 years in prison, now they face between 12 and 20 years. Moscow’s Basmannyy District Court also extended the four’s period of arrest to 22 February 2025. Separately, the court extended until 25 February 2025 the arrest of 24-year-old Shakhromdzhon Gadoyev and 21-year-old Mustakim Soliyev, two Tajikistani citizens who are accused of preparing a terrorist attack in Kaspiysk and supplying weapons to the Crocus City Hall attackers. The case is one of the largest terrorism investigations in recent years, with more than 1,700 people recognised as victims and more than 800 witnesses. You can find full details on the investigation in the updated Event in Review article on the Threatologist website.
🪖 Private military companies (PMCs) 🪖
Shugaley and friends return to Moscow from Chad: Maksim Shugaley, a “sociologist” who is closely associated with Wagner, has reportedly returned to Moscow along with two other Russians and one Belarusian. The four men were detained in Chad’s capital, Ndjamena, in September, but Chadian President Mahamat Idriss Deby ordered their release and transfer to Russia. Kommersant had earlier claimed the arrest could be connected to a May 2024 article in Jeune Afrique linking Shugaley to late Wagner owner Yevgeniy Prigozhin and claiming Shugaley was working to interfere in Chad’s domestic politics. Shugaley’s links to the Prigozhin empire were, however, well-documented well before this publication: he has been the subject of multiple propaganda films by Prigozhin’s media firms, and has already been sanctioned by the EU for his links to Prigozhin.
Prosecutors seek jail term for Wagner memorial vandalism: Prosecutors have requested jail terms for two men accused of vandalising a memorial to Wagner and other participants of the “special military operation” in Moscow. They have asked that 28-year-old Daniil Golikova be sentenced to two and a half years and 26-year-old Andrey Kozlovskiy receive a three-year term. The two men reportedly vandalised the memorial on Ulitsa Varvarka in March 2024, causing an estimated 55,000 roubles worth of damage.
Wagner commander in CAR interviewed: Dmitriy Podolskiy (Salem), a Wagner commander in CAR who was appointed as an adviser to President Touadera on security issues in September 2024, gave an interview to RTVI. He portrayed current insurgent activity in the country as negligible and only intended to attract funding from “Western sponsors.” He also implied that, while some Wagner fighters joined the Russian Defence Ministry and Rosgvardia, the majority remain independent.
🚨 Everything else 🚨
Source of Kadyrov assassination plot rumours identified: Two men have recorded a video in which they indirectly name Magomed Gadzhiyev, a former State Duma deputy from Dagestan, as the source of rumours about an assassination attempt on Chechen Head Ramzan Kadyrov. The men, Abdula Mamadibirov and Murad Goshdadov, claim that they spread the rumours on Gadzhiyev’s instruction, but are now going public because they haven’t received the money they were promised. They do not explicitly name Gadzhiyev, but refer to “Maga,” which media sources have interpreted as a reference to Gadzhiyev. The video is the latest, and somewhat bizarre, development in a feud that has developed between Kadyrov and three other North Caucasian figures — Dagestani oligarch Suleyman Kerimov, State Duma Deputy for Dagestan Rizvan Kurbanov, and State Duma Deputy for Ingushetia Bekkhan Barakhoyev — over the Wildberries case. In the aftermath of the failed intervention by Kadyrovtsy in the dispute between Tatyana Kim (Bakalchuk) and her husband, and an armed raid on the Wildberries offices in Moscow, Kadyrov accused the three men of plotting to assassinate him, in response to which he threatened to declare a blood feud against them. Novaya Gazeta claimed that Kadyrov had made up the assassination plot, citing an anonymous FSB source. The latest video would seemingly position Gadzhiyev as working against Kerimov, although not exactly on the side of Kadyrov. The whole episode is somewhere between gangsterism and farce.
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