Russian private military companies don’t really exist. Here’s why — and why that matters
For a while, the term 'Russian private military companies' has been troubling me. So I've written an article tackling the issues with it, explaining why there is no such thing as a Russian PMC, why this mislabelling matters, and why I will continue to use the term despite these reservations.
I’d welcome any thoughts you have on this: Just hit reply.
The main thrust of the piece is that each of the words is incorrect and fundamentally misleading:
Company: Russian PMCs are neither legal nor commercial entities. Despite their increasing integration into the Russian state, they remain illegal. But they also do not compete on a commercial basis. This has not always been the case, something I might explore in a separate post.
Military: A key difference between Russian PMCs and their Western counterparts is their willingness to directly engage in combat activities, so the military component is important. But actors like Wagner and its affiliates have engaged in a much wider range of activities, from cyber and influence operations to mining — and in some countries the military component has been lacking.
Private: Russian PMCs are not independent of the Russian state, especially now. While the nature of both the PMC industry and Russian capitalism complicate matters, Russian PMCs shouldn’t be thought of as being outside state control and responsibility.
Russian: This is possibly the only component of the label that is accurate. Yes, Russian PMCs have recruited non-Russian citizens, but command and control remains distinctly Russian.
Does any of this matter, given that Russian state control over PMCs is well understood by now? I would argue yes. It is only possible to design responses if we can agree what we are designing responses to — and, in the legal domain in particular, a ‘we know it when we see it’ approach is clearly insufficient. And there is a danger of becoming analytically complicit in Russian state efforts to exploit plausible deniability — where plausibility has always been secondary to deniability. The words we use, in short, matter.
Yet I will also continue to use the PMC label. There are a lack of widely accepted and understood alternatives, and it becomes difficult to communicate with audiences dealing with PMCs if you don’t use the term. There also remains something distinct about such state-linked actors, when compared to the regular military. So I don’t have a concrete solution to these questions, but I try to offer some ideas in that direction.
In the news
💣 The 2nd Western District Military Court sentenced Orlov Oblast native Dmitriy Mezenin to 18 years on treason and terrorism charges. In addition to treason, the court found him guilty of membership of a terrorist organisation and acquiring explosives through the internet. Mediazona suggested Mezenin may have tried to join the Russian Volunteer Corps or the Free Russia Legion.
🪖 Piotr Kucharski from Watford, Hertfordshire in the UK has pleaded not guilty to being a member of the Wagner Group. Prosecutors allege that Kucharski was a member of Wagner between September and October 2023. He will now stand trial.
💣 Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) reported that they had detained a native of a Central Asian country in Stavropol Kray who was planning a terrorist attack on a bus station in Yessentuki. The FSB claim the man planned to travel to Syria and join a terrorist organisation after carrying out the attack.
💣 The Central District Military Court has sentenced a woman from Kurgan Oblast to six years in prison for publishing material online that justified terrorism and incited racial hatred. The woman was allegedly a member of the Union of Slavic Forces of Rus (USSR), which rejects the legitimacy of the modern Russian Federation.
🪖 Marcel Plichta, Christopher Faulkner and Raphael Parens examine the Wagner Group’s operations in Africa, seeing the rebranded entity, the African Corps, as thriving under the control of the Russian Ministry of Defence. The African Corps is currently supporting governments in Mali, the Central African Republic, Burkina-Faso, Niger, Libya, and Sudan, and it may look to expand its operations further into Chad. The article includes a critique of current policy towards Wagner, pointing out how slow the US has been to respond to developments.
💣 Investigators have accused Magomed Magomedov, former Dagestani minister for physical culture and sport and Kizilyurt mayor, of financing an illegal armed formation. They claim that, in 2006, Magomedov — at the time, head of Gergebilskiy Rayon — provided $100,000 to crime boss Magomed Magomedaliyev, who was killed in a special operation in 2013. Magomedov was detained in October 2023 on charges of embezzling state funds.
Visual reference guide
Some of you are only interested in one of the topics that I cover. That's cool! Use the emojis to quickly see which topic a story relates to — so you only need to read the material that matters to you.
🪖 — Private military companies
💣 — Terrorism & insurgency
🚔 — Chechen security services
👺 — The Chechen elite
🚨 — Other security-related issues