🚨 Does Russia have a North Caucasus policy right now?
Both its economic and its security policy appear to be driven by inertia rather than ideas and focus.
I was recently asked who drives federal policy towards the North Caucasus. And, to be honest, I don't think I gave a very good answer. On the one hand, decision-making processes are opaque, meaning it can sometimes be a challenge to identify those involved in them. On the other hand, while it is possible to pick out numerous individuals who play a role, none of those people appear to be actually driving policy. Functionaries outnumber visionaries by a considerable margin.
Yet there was a deeper reason why such a seemingly simple question felt so hard to answer, and it took me a while to put my finger on it. What it boils down to is this: I’m not convinced Russia has much of a policy for the North Caucasus right now. Decision-makers are naturally harder to spot when not many difficult decisions are being made.
Russia’s approach to the region has always had two main planks: Economy and security. In both domains, Russia’s approach appears to be governed by inertia and maintenance of the status-quo, rather than new ideas and a clear strategy for dealing with long-standing and emerging problems.
On the economic front, the federal government updated its socioeconomic development plan for the region. The previous strategy, due to expire in 2025, was replaced with one extending to 2030. Yet this felt more like a minor refresh, reflecting Russia’s post-invasion and sanctions reality, rather than a major initiative. Russia updated numerous economic policies around the same time for the same reason, and the ‘new’ North Caucasus policy was not the most important of these. More fundamentally, most of these policies are overly ambitious and unlikely to be realised, with many government leaders not evidently attached to anything. The recent Caucasus Investment Forum, hosted by Groznyy, likewise looks like just the latest of many failed attempts to attract significant investment to the region. Overall, economic policy has a distinct ‘old wine in new bottle’ vibe to it.
On the security front, Russia’s war on Ukraine has naturally resulted in resources and attention shifting away from the region. Terrorism — which for the region still primarily means the threat of jihadism — remains a key concern. However, the demise of the insurgency means the region does not command the same sustained attention it used to. And recent developments in Dagestan and Karachayevo-Cherkessia indicate that the security forces are not adapting well to emerging threats: they lack intelligence and the ability to respond quickly and competently to events. The situation remains manageable, for now at least. But complacency and continuity appear to be the order of the day.
One indicator of the lack of policy direction arguably comes from the apparent slow degradation of the role of North Caucasus Federal District plenipotentiary. The significance of the post should not be exaggerated, but when it was first created in 2010, it felt like its first occupant, Aleksandr Khloponin, was at the least playing an important role coordinating federal policy in the region. Moreover, the choice of Khloponin and his successor, Sergey Melikov, was used to signal the Kremlin’s policy priorities: economic development in the former case, security in the latter. It’s an inherently subjective impression that requires further exploration to confirm, but the current occupant feels like a much more passive and peripheral figure. And if you can’t remember who that occupant is, consider that a point proven!
I'd very much welcome thoughts on this: Do you feel the federal authorities have a clear policy towards the region? And, if so, who is shaping it?
In the news
💣 A court in Rostov-on-the-Don sentenced a resident of Yessentuki, Stavropol Kray to seven years for planning a terrorist attack on a military recruitment office. According to investigators, Sergey Stanchev coordinated his activities with the Free Russia Legion and the Ukrainian military.
🪖 Ukrainian military intelligence has claimed that it provided intelligence to rebels in Mali, allowing them to inflict major losses on the African Corps. Mali’s ruling military regime broke off diplomatic relations with Ukraine as a result of the claims. A group of 70 people commemorated the killed Russian troops outside the Kremlin.
💣 The Russian Justice Ministry has added to its list of designated extremist organisations, bringing the total of North Caucasian national movements to at least 12: the Anti-Russian Separatist Movement, the Circassian Congress, the Circassian Cultural Centre, the Council of United Circassia, the Human Rights Centre Ichkeria, the Free Circassia movement, the Ingush Independence Committee, the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in exile, the World Chechen Congress, the Dagestan National Centre, Free Dagestan, and the Caucasian Union.
💣 Two residents of Azov, Rostov Oblast have been arrested on terrorism charges. Investigators claim they planned an attack on an railways electrical substation in return for RUB 20,000.
💣 The Southern District Military Court sentenced six people to between seven and 23 years in prison for planning to blow up a police station in Kislovodsk, Stavropol Kray. Several were also charged with providing money to the Islamic State.
💣 A court in Germany has sentenced a 17-year-old native of Chechnya to four years in prison for preparing a terrorist attack on a Christmas market in Leverkusen. The youth apparently planned — together with a 15-year-old accomplice, who has already been convicted — to carry out a mass killing using a lorry and a knife.
💣 Security services in Dagestan have detained two 18-year-olds and one juvenile on charges of supporting the Islamic State and planning an attack on an Orthodox church in Makhachkala.
💣 A city court in Karachayevo-Cherkessia has ordered the arrest of a resident of Bashkortostan who is accused of planning a terrorist attack on the building of the Cherkessk city prosecutor’s office.
🚔 Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov has asked the Russian Ministry of Defence to give the leaders of Russia’s republics the authority to create regiments and battalions that can be deployed to Russia’s war on Ukraine. Kadyrov claims that the Russian University of Spetsnaz, based in Gudermes, currently has more volunteers than it can process. In total, Kadyrov has said the University has prepared more than 18,600 volunteers to fight in Ukraine.
🪖 Videos on social media appeared to show military personnel wearing the badge of Russian private military company (PMC) Wagner mingling with Venezuelan security personnel. The country is experiencing unrest following President Nicolás Maduro’s fraudulent claim of victory in presidential elections.
🪖 Two men appeared in court in London accused of an arson attack on Ukrainian-owned property on behalf of the Wagner group. Jakeem Barrington Rose and Ugnius Asmena were charged under the National Security Act; five other men are due to stand trial for causing the major blaze in Leyton, London in March.
🪖 A court in Rostov-on-the-Don sentenced former Wagner fighter Vladimir Miroshnichenko to four years in prison for attacking his nephew in a dispute over a flat. Miroshnichenko was sentenced in 2012 to eight years for killing the nephew’s grandmother; he was later convicted of a separate robbery, before being recruited to Wagner from prison. Miroshnichenko claimed self defence in the latest incident, while the court considered his involvement in Russia’s war on Ukraine a mitigating circumstance.
Visual reference guide
Some of you are only interested in one of the topics that I cover. That's cool! Use the emojis to quickly see which topic a story relates to — so you only need to read the material that matters to you.
🪖 — Private military companies
💣 — Terrorism & insurgency
🚔 — Chechen security services
👺 — The Chechen elite
🚨 — Other security-related issues