Russia’s difficulties in replacing Wagner shouldn’t come as a surprise
Antonio Giustozzi and David Lewis have released a new report reflecting on the legacy and trajectory of Russian private military company (PMC) Wagner since it's notorious "march of justice" in June 2023 and the death of its owner, Yevgeniy Prigozhin, in August of the same year.
The report provides a good overview of key developments and reflects on the group's current trajectory. While I disagree on its characterisation of the origins of Wagner, its overall conclusion seems sound: Russia — and in particular the Ministry of Defence (MoD) — “has struggled to replace Wagner while retaining the flexibility and effectiveness of its operations on the ground.”
This, however, shouldn’t really come as a surprise. It is a product of fundamental contradictions between the advantages offered by PMCs and the current goals of the Russian state.
On the one hand, regardless of how strong the links between the Russian security apparatus and Wagner — and they were very strong — Wagner operated outside the traditional military chain of command. The war in Ukraine has highlighted a defining characteristic of the Russian military (indeed, arguably the Russian state as a whole): It is very slow at responding to new challenges and threats and struggles to adapt quickly to changing circumstances but, when it does eventually respond, it is able to bring substantial resources to bear. I think of the Russian military as akin to a stereotypical no-neck thuggish bouncer. It is not agile, particularly smart, or even necessarily the most effective in combat. But it is strong, powerful, and more than capable of inflicting pain. In other words, it may not be particularly admirable, but it shouldn’t be underestimated. By operating outside a top-down, tightly controlled command structure, PMCs have been able to compensate from some of the shortcomings of the traditional military and display the agility that would otherwise be lacking, while still benefitting from the resources of the state.
On the other hand, the current Russian political system is largely intolerant of forces and actors outside of its control. Indeed, Prigozhin’s “march of justice” demonstrates that it can have good reason to be wary of such things. The Russian state’s push to bring Wagner and the PMC universe more widely under tighter state control has therefore been predictable. As the report documents, after the “march of justice,” the Russian Ministry of Defence in particular sought to subordinate and absorb Wagner’s operations; Prigozhin’s death only accelerated these processes.
The problem is that this subordination works to negate the aforementioned advantage offered by PMCs in the first place. The tighter the control, the more limited the agility — and the more PMCs come to resemble traditional military actors. The report sees post-Prigozhin developments as in part an effort to avoid “the constraints of standard MoD regulations, bureaucracy and culture,” yet it is the MoD itself that has essentially been tasked with achieving this goal. Institutional culture shifts are hard enough to achieve when they are widely supported, never mind when they are ambiguously pursued.
That is not to say that the entire advantage offered by PMCs is lost. Even if, as a quoted source says, “there is no direct continuity between Wagner Group and the African Corps, other than…the preservation of certain traditions, symbols and the recognition of past awards,” African Corps is also not operating as a standard military deployment either. As such, the advantage is diminished but not lost. Yet the fundamental contradiction means we shouldn’t really be surprised that, post-Prigozhin, Russia has struggled to replace Wagner. It is seeking to replicate the advantages of agility without allowing the freedom of operation that produces the agility in the first place.
You can read Giustozzi and Lewis’ full report here. It’s well worth a gander.
In the news
💣 Terrorism & insurgency
The Central District Military Court has begun hearing a case against three people accused of planning an attack on railroads in Sverdlovsk Oblast. The suspects are all 19-year-olds: Danil Yeliseyev from Krasnoufimsk, Arseniy Klimin from Nizhniy Tagil, and Nikita Sukhorokov from Yekaterinburg. Investigators claim that the leader of the group, Andrey Martynov, is a member of the Free Russia Legion and recruited the men via Telegram, offering money as reward for the attack.
A court in Bruges, Belgium sentenced a native of Chechnya to 15 years in prison for planning a series of terrorist attacks in the country. The man, identified as Abubakar S. reportedly planned to target different places in Antwerp, including the Jewish quarter, an LGBTQ bar, a police station, and a NATO building, and he had already begun preparations. His wife received an eight-year sentence, his brother and one other received suspended sentences and fines, and a fifth suspect was acquitted.
A 30-year-old female resident of Chechnya has been accused of transferring money to an unspecified international terrorist organisation in 2017.
The Southern District Military Court has sentenced Sevastopol resident Vladimir Pazni to 16 years in prison on charges of treason and preparing a terrorist attack. According to investigators, Pazni provided location information on a car belonging to a senior member of Russia’s Black Sea fleet and then installed an improvised explosive device provided by Ukraine in the vehicle.
Rustam Azhiyev (Abdul-Khakim al-Shishani) has been promoted to the role of Deputy Defence Minister of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. Azhiyev, who is fighting with Ukraine against Russia, previously headed the Ministry’s Department of Military Intelligence; Ibragim Dzhami replaces him in that role.
The Federal Security Service (FSB) reported on the detention of a man accused of planning terrorist attacks in Russia on behalf of Ukraine. The man, a citizen of a Commonwealth of Independent States’ country, was apprehended in Rostov Oblast.
The Southern District Military Court has sentenced 64-year-old Alavdi Batykayev, a resident of Chechnya, to 16 years in prison for participating on an attack on Pskov paratroopers in 2000. Batykayev allegedly fought with a group led by Shamil Basayev and Emir Khattab during the early stages of the Second Chechen War — although prosecutors claim he remained with the group until 2022, citing his failure to inform the authorities that he had left it as proof. Human rights organisation Memorial declared the case against Batykayev to lack foundation, pointing to a reliance on anonymous witnesses and photo identification. Russia routinely prosecutes historic cases from the period.
🪖 Private military companies (PMCs)
A Ghanaian government official has accused the Wagner Group (i.e. now the African Corps, formally subordinate to the Russian Ministry of Defence) of purchasing smuggled cocoa from Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire. Joseph Aidoo, CEO of the Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD), told journalists the country’s military would be involved in combatting smuggling. He is the first local government official to comment on Wagner’s activities in Ghana.
Reuters claims it has identified 23 members of the African Corps who were killed recently in Mali. The men included those with experience fighting in Ukraine, Libya and Syria. It cites the case of Vadim Evsiukov, who was recruited from prison, fought in Ukraine, struggled to readapt to civilian life, and so joined one of the deployments to Africa. Evsiukov’s biography reflects that of many Wagner recruits: time spent in prison, difficulties finding a place in civilian life at home, and rejoining PMCs as either a pathway to self-realisation or because all of the money earned from previous deployments has already been lost. The biographies of others killed also share common traits with those of other Wagner fighters: Alexandre Lazarev, for example, fought in Chechnya in the 1990s and 2000s. Aleksey Kuzekmaev was more unusual, with neither military experience nor time in prison identified.
A court in Adygea has sentenced a former Wagner fighter to 10 years six months for robbery, assault and murder. The 36-year-old resident of Dondukovskaya had attempted to rob a house and attacked two people inside, one of whom died from his injuries. He had been convicted previously for similar offences. As is customary in such cases, the court considered his participation in Russia’s war on Ukraine an extenuating circumstance.
A court in Uzbekistan has convicted a citizen of the country who joined Wagner on charges of mercenary activities. The man — identified only as B.Z.,a resident of Tashkent born in 1976 — helped Wagner in Ukraine and Belarus and participated in Wagner’s “march for justice.” He had travelled to Russia in September 2022 in search of work, joining Wagner in May 2023, where he performed non-combat duties. He was released from his contract after Prigozhin’s death in August 2023, having declined the opportunity to serve in Africa. He returned to Uzbekistan in September 2023 and will now serve four years in prison.
The European Union removed Violetta Prigozhina, Yevgeniy’s mother, from its sanctions list. The European Court of Justice concluded in March 2023 that being a relative of the PMC owner was insufficient grounds for sanctioning her — even though she was formerly the registered owner of a company in Prigozhin’s Concord empire and family members are often used to conceal assets.
🚔 State-linked security services
The family of an anti-war activist who was abducted by Chechen security forces in October 2023 have reported the theft of the activist’s car to police. Aleksandr Demidenko, a 61-year-old from Belgorod who had participated in anti-war protests and helped Ukrainian refugees, was detained by Akhmat-Zapad troops and subsequently arrested, while his home was also searched. He later died in police custody. The car has not been returned to Demidenko’s relatives and investigators claim they cannot find it, while also refusing to investigate the circumstances around his death — which they claim was suicide. The case is an example of the impunity with which Chechen security services are able to operate.
A commander for a reconnaissance group within Spetsnaz Akhmat, identified only as Aid, gave an interview to Izvestiya. He discussed the unit’s response to Ukraine’s invasion of Kursk Oblast, portraying it as successful in difficult circumstances.
Spetsnaz Akhmat commander Apty Alaudinov claimed in a Telegram post that members of the unit who surrendered to Ukraine don’t “deserve to live.” He claimed they had “surrendered like little girls” and no effort would be made to secure their release through a prisoner swap.
The Foreign Ministry of Azerbaijan lodged a formal protest with Russia over the forced recruitment of its citizens to fight in Ukraine. According to Azerbaijani media, three Azerbaijanis were detained in Chechnya for alleged migration offences and then forcibly conscripted into Sever-Akhmat, one of Chechnya’s units within the Russian Ministry of Defence.