Russia subtly shifts from Syria to Sudan
Sudan’s Foreign Minister Ali al-Sharif has reported that his country has reached an agreement on a Russian naval base in the country, following talks in Moscow with his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov.
Al-Sharif was in Moscow for what Russia called a “working visit,” dedicated to “resolving the ongoing military and political crisis in that country.” The talks over the base resurrected an agreement originally reached in 2020, but placed under review by the Sudanese authorities in mid-2021. Now, al-Sharif says there are “no obstacles” to implementing it. The base would be hosted near Port Sudan, which is the headquarters of the Sudanese army and the country’s de facto president, Abdul Fattah al Burhan. In its original conception, it would have lasted for 25 years and provided a logistics hub for warships and up to 300 personnel.
What is curious about the latest agreement — which at this stage remains verbal — is the silence from Moscow. Lavrov did not comment on the meeting directly, and the Russian Foreign Ministry’s press release made no mention of agreement over the base. Mainstream Russian media outlets were similarly silent: the talks were not covered by the print editions of Kommersant, Vedomosti, Izvestiya, or Rossiyskaya Gazeta.
One reason for the silence could be that Russia is maintaining a delicate balancing act. It has, after all, long had ties to both the Sudanese Armed Forces and their opponents, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Sudan was the first African country that Russian private military company (PMC) Wagner deployed to, way back in 2017, and companies linked to its founder, Yevgeniy Prigozhin, leveraged their ties with Sudanese military intelligence to establish a variety of commercial operations in the country. At the same time, Wagner reportedly supplied RSF with weapons. There was considerably continuity in Russian operations before and after the ousting of long-serving leader Omar al-Bashir — the naval base deal was first discussed with Bashir in 2019 before being signed by the military that ousted him in November 2020. Russia may simply be hedging its bets, given the fragile hold on power of the current Sudanese regime. Another reason for Moscow’s caution could be a lack of trust, following the Sudanese authorities reversal on the base in 2021. There is little question that a base would serve Russia’s strategic interests, and Russian officials have repeatedly visited Port Sudan in recent months.
The backdrop for the talks is uncertainty over the fate of Russia’s Tartus naval base and Hmeimem air base in Syria, which I covered in the newsletter a couple of weeks ago. Since then, Syria has signalled its willingness to let the bases stay. In an interview with The Washington Post, Syrian Defence Minister Murhad Abu Qasra said the country was willing to allow Russia to keep its air and naval bases if it was in Syria’s interests. Both sides appear to be adopting a pragmatic approach to negotiations. The new minister embraced the idea that, in politics, there are no perpetual enemies, only interests. He also refused to comment on whether Syria had requested the extradition of ousted dictator Bashar al-Assad. Russian President Vladimir Putin, meanwhile, spoke with new Syrian leader Ahmed al-Sharaa on 12 February and expressed his support for Syria’s territorial integrity, but the future of the bases was not mentioned in the press release about the call. Just as Russia may be hedging its bets within Sudan, it may be doing the same in regards to Syria.
Elsewhere in the world of Russian security
💣 Terrorism & insurgency 💣
Guilt by association: The Russian government has proposed legislative changes to allow organisations and associations to be declared extremist if just one member is convicted of organising an extremist group. Another change included in the three legislative proposals submitted to the State Duma is skipping the requirement for people accused of promoting or justifying violence to face administrative sanctions before criminal charges can be brought. The authorities regularly expand the criteria for designating and banning undesirable organisations.
Attacks on military, sabotage prevented in Rostov, Voronezh and Sevastopol: The Federal Security Service (FSB) claim that they managed to prevent attacks on Russian military personnel and acts of sabotage on energy facilities in Rostov-on-the-Don, Voronezh, and Sevastopol. The FSB detained four women whom they allege were working as “agents” of the Ukrainian security services and received weapons training from them.
Orenburg pawnbroker sentenced to 20 years for terrorism and treason: The Central District Military Court in Yekaterinburg sentenced Aleksey Grigoryev, a pawnbroker from the town of Novotroitska in Orenburg Oblast, to 20 years on charges of planning a terrorist attack, membership of a terrorist organisation, and treason. Prosecutors alleged that Grigoryev collaborated with the Ukrainian organisation I Want To Live, which helps Russian servicemen to defect; wanted to join the Free Russia Legion; and planned arson attacks on infrastructure and military recruitment offices. In his closing statement in court, Grigoryev accused the Russian authorities of genocide against Ukraine and labelled the court a “circus.”
Police officer attacked in Dagestan: Three unknown people attacked a police officer in the Dagestani city of Derbent, seizing his firearm and then shooting at him. The police officer was seriously wounded in the attack and the attackers were detained.
Crocus City Hall attack investigation wrapped up in record time: Kommersant has confirmed that the investigation into the March 2024 attack on Moscow’s Crocus City Hall has concluded and the suspects are now reviewing the evidence against them. Most of the accused face life sentences; four are accused of carrying out the attack on behalf of the Islamic State’s Khorasan Vilayyat, the rest of helping them. Kommersant noted that the investigation of the case had been concluded unusually quickly, and at least six months quicker than cases of similar size.
Dagestani woman sentenced for living in the Islamic State: Derbent native Milana Kurbanova received an eight-year prison sentence for living under the Islamic State in Syria. She allegedly travelled with her family via Turkey and Egypt in 2014, arriving in Syria the following year. She split with her husband, who was killed by an airstrike shortly afterwards, before returning to Turkey in summer 2017. She voluntarily returned to Russia, despite being aware of the open criminal case against her; she received the minimal sentence because of her confession and the fact that she has two young children.
Not-so-free Russia Legion: The First Western District Military Court sentenced Leningrad Oblast resident Ivan Kryukov to 11 years in prison for membership of the Free Russia Legion. Investigators claim that he joined the group via Telegram and opposed Putinism and the war on Ukraine, and that he followed the group’s instructions to spoil his ballot paper in the presidential election and provide information. Kryukov told the court that he regretted his actions and was motivated by greed.
Chelyabinsk man convicted of treason, sabotage and terrorism: The Central District Military Court sentenced a resident of Chelyabinsk to 19 years in prison for joining a banned terrorist organisation, cooperating with the Ukrainian security services, carrying out an arson attack on transport infrastructure, and planning a terrorist attack on a Defence Ministry property. It is not clear when he was detained, and his name was not published.
Stavropol Kray resident accused of financing terrorism: A court has arrested a 27-year-old Neftekumsk resident who is accused of transferring money in 2022 to an acquaintance fighting in Syria.
Another Stavropol Kray resident convicted in prison extremism case: A court has sentenced a resident of Stavropol Kray to three years in prison for joining a banned extremist organisation while serving time between 2021 and 2023. The man was already in jail for violence towards a juvenile, but was detained on the new charges in 2024.
Amur Oblast resident sentenced for terrorism plot: The 1st Eastern District Military Court sentenced a resident of Amur Oblast to nine years in prison for preparing a terrorist attack and illegal weapons possession. The man was detained in 2022. Security services allege he was trying to acquire weapons from a military unit and carry out attacks on judicial institutions, the police, and railway infrastructure. They also claim he was found in possession of documentation from two banned organisations, the Union of Slavic Forces of Rus and the People’s Council of Amur Oblast.
Intelligence officer accused of extortion, membership of extremist group: Nalchik resident Aslan Shogenov was placed under house arrest in December 2024 for extortion, but charges of belonging to an extremist group were soon added. The Supreme Court of Kabardino-Balkaria has rejected Shogenov’s appeal against his arrest.
Train station attack prevented in Pskov: The FSB claim that they have prevented a terrorist attack on a train station in Pskov. According to investigators, a cell of an unspecified international terrorist organisation had cased the location, acquired components for an improvised explosive device, and planned to travel abroad after the attack. The group were killed during attempts to arrest them.
🪖 Private military companies (PMCs) 🪖
Two new reports on Wagner: RUSI have released two new reports on the Wagner group. The first examines the Wagner business model, asking whether PMCs constitute a profitable enterprise. It finds that some Wagner deployments were loss makers, some barely profitable, and some highly lucrative — and that questions over the model’s sustainability may have dissuaded other influential actors from taking up the Wagner mantel. The second looks at Wagner’s operations in Africa from the perspective of the states that hired it. It argues that Wagner did not primarily help embattled regimes survive, but instead provided a short-term fix for very specific problems. However, its activities increased the risk of the contracting regimes becoming reliant on external support.
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